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Abstract 
This paper investigates growth differences in the urban system of the EU12 over the last 
decades of the 20th Century. Models in which growth of real GDP p.c. and rates of 
population growth are the dependent variables are compared. This suggests that it makes 
sense to model GDP growth in a European context. The analysis supports the conclusion 
that systems of urban governance are significantly related to economic growth, as is the 
distribution of highly skilled human capital and R&D activity. In addition, evidence is 
found supporting the conclusion that integration shocks in the EU favour core areas but 
when all else is controlled for peripheral regions experienced a systematic positive growth 
differential. Careful testing for spatial dependence reveals that national borders are 
significant barriers to adjustment but we can resolve such problems by including a set of 
variables designed to reflect spatial economic adjustment mechanisms where cities are 
densely packed so their economies interact. Models of population growth show some 
similar results but interesting and revealing differences. Strong evidence is found that there 
are substantial national border effects impeding the emergence of a full spatial equilibrium 
across the EU’s urban system. Better climate is the single most significant variable but only 
when expressed relative to the national (not EU) mean. As with economic growth, there are 
significant national border effects in patterns of spatial dependence. Concentrations of 
human capital and R&D, however are if anything negatively associated with attracting 
population – a finding which parallels the finding that a better climate relative to the 
national mean is associated with slower rather than faster growth of real GDP per capita. 
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We start with a brief analysis of demographic growth in the major city regions 
of the EU of 12 over the period 1980 to 2000. This concludes that interregional 
migration is orders of magnitude less in the EU than in the US and responds to 
variables measuring quality of life only as they differ within countries. This 
suggests that it is appropriate to analyse differential rates of growth of real 
GDP per capita not just if one is interested in productivity growth differentials 
but also if one is interested in investigating differences in welfare changes 
across Europe’s cities. Despite a compensating variations approach showing 
that people adjusted to differences in quality of life between cities within 
countries, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that no such pattern 
exists across the urban system of Europe as a whole. In that sense, city regions 
within the EU seem to behave like city-states, not as simply the spatial units 
from which a continental economy is constructed. The central assumption of 
perfectly mobile factors and the equalisation of real marginal returns across 
cities explicit in models of compensating variations (the Quality of Life 
approach developed on the basis of Roback’s 1982 contribution) cannot 
reasonably be maintained in the European context.  
 
This paper, therefore, turns to an analysis of differential rates of growth of real 
income across city regions (represented as Functional Urban Regions or FURs 
– as used in Cheshire and Magrini, 2000). In particular, we explore the role of 
three types of variable identified in economic theory as potentially important 
in explaining economic growth in a spatial context. The first is the systematic 
spatial effects of European integration. Empirical interest in this goes back at 
least to Clark et al (1969) and it is interesting to use as an explanatory variable 
the measure actually derived by Clark and his associates before the impact of 
European integration was significantly felt. Interest in these factors has been 
given a significant boost as a result of the theoretical developments of New 
                                                 
1 The  authors have benefited from many discussions with colleagues as this work has 
developed but remain responsible for any remaining deficiencies or errors.  
   3
Economic Geography as summarised, for example, in Fujita et al., 1999. The 
second variable we are interested in is the role of R&D and highly skilled 
human capital. Here we focus on testing a spatialised adaptation of 
endogenous growth theory (see Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1996 or, for a more 
rigorous development, Magrini, 1998). The third idea we are interested in 
investigating is the relationship between systems of city government and city 
growth performance. Here we test one of the basic propositions of fiscal 
federalism: that “the existence and magnitude of spillover effects clearly 
depends on the geographical extent of the relevant jurisdiction” (Oates, 1999). 
Specifically we test that there is a positive relationship between the degree of 
co-incidence of governmental boundaries with those of the functionally 
defined city-region and the growth performance of the city-region.  
 
We have also pay particular attention to issues of spatial dependence. Spatial 
econometrics tends to exist as a distinct field in which a finding of spatial 
dependence is often an end in itself  - sometimes to be ‘corrected’ by 
introducing spatial lags or other appropriate econometric devices. Our views 
are somewhat different. It seems important to test for spatial dependence since, 
if it is present, and the analysis does not properly take it into account, 
parameter estimates can be biased just as they can be in time series analysis if 
there are problems of serial autocorrelation which are not offset for. However, 
it seems to us that the discovery of spatial dependence should trigger a further 
but economically inspired investigation. An indicated problem of spatial 
dependence suggests there is a specification problem. Something which 
explains this pattern has been omitted and if the model is specified better then 
the problem should be resolved. This is particularly relevant in investigating 
spatial economic processes since theory suggests that there are important 
spatial adjustment mechanisms and other spatially determined features of 
economies. For example, labour markets and housing markets are likely to 
adjust to price and real wage differences in ways conditioned on some measure 
of distance. Theoretical and empirical investigations of agglomeration 
economies, human capital and innovation suggest there are important spatial   4
aspects of these features of economies. These are possible sources of spatial 
interaction between cities’ economies which, if not represented in the model, 
would plausibly show up as spatial dependence.  
 
As the results reported below suggest, there seems to be some validity to this 
viewpoint. When we estimate growth models in which no spatial adjustment 
processes are explicitly included, tests show that there are problems of spatial 
dependence. However deliberately including measures of spatial economic 
adjustment processes, which are a function of the distance between cities, 
eliminates spatial dependence and specification problems.  
 
In addition, the way in which the sensitivity of the models to measures of 
spatial dependence varies with the particular distance weights used to calculate 
‘proximity’ (the spatial weights matrix) provides, in our interpretation, insight 
into economic processes. In processes of both population and GDP growth 
problems of spatial dependence only reveal themselves if an additional 
distance penalty to adjustment is included for national borders: this, we judge, 
tells one about the extent to which urban systems in Western Europe still 
interact as a set of national urban systems rather than as a unified EU urban 
system. 
 
2.   Data and variables 
All the analysis is performed on a data set built up over a 25 year period 
relating to Functional Urban Regions (FURs) defined
2 so far as possible 
according to common criteria across the EU of 12. Such FURs correspond to 
                                                 
2  For a detailed discussion of the definition of the FURs used throughout this paper see 
Cheshire and Hay (1989). They are defined on the basis of core cities  identified by 
concentrations of employment and hinterlands from which more commuters flow to the 
employment core than to any other subject to a minimum cut off. They were defined on the 
basis of data for 1971. They are broadly similar in concept to the (Standard) Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas used in the US. As has been argued elsewhere (Cheshire and Hay, 1989) the 
great variability in the relationship between administrative boundaries and the economic reality 
of European cities and regions introduces serious error and a strong likelihood of bias into data 
reported for administratively defined cities. The FUR/city and region of Bremen provide an 
extreme but not wholly unrepresentative example. Because of population relative to 
employment decentralisation over the relevant period the growth of GDP p.c. is overstated by 
some 40% if the published Eurostat data for the administrative region is relied on.   5
the economic spheres of influence of significant employment concentrations 
and are relatively self-contained in economic terms. The analysis is conducted 
only for FURs with a population of more than one third of a million and a core 
city which exceeded 200 000 at some date between 1951 and 1981. Cities of 
the former eastern Länder of Germany and Berlin have to be excluded because 
of lack of data. The new basis on which Eurostat estimated regional GDP from 
1995 onwards means that the analysis stops then. The variables used are 
defined in Table 1 which also provides a brief description of the sources used.  
More detail can be found in Cheshire and Magrini (2006b). All data are 
defined to common statistical concepts either weighting data available from 
the Eurostat REGIO database to estimate values for FURs or collected directly 
from national statistical offices or common data providers and adjusted where 
necessary to common definitions. There is necessarily some imperfection and 
imprecision in such data but they have the merit of not only allowing analysis 
of specifically European cities but also of allowing the investigation of 
questions which, because of lack of variation, simply could not be investigated 
in the context of the US urban system.  
 
The analysis employs OLS but we provide substantial testing to see whether 
the results are subject to econometric problems. Since the observations 
represent the population of West European city-regions, the force of the 
standard objections to the use of cross sectional OLS for inference seem to be 
substantially mitigated. Compared to cross country ‘growth regressions’ our 
observations represent a relatively homogeneous population and data are more 
comparable. We also try to minimise the impact of the standard problems 
associated with the use of regression to investigate causal processes by using 
spatial units which minimise nuisance noise in the data and formulating 
variables in ways which reflect views of causal mechanisms and minimise 
problems of endogeneity. As with all applied econometrics, however, in the 
end the credibility of results is not a categorical issue but depends on 
judgement. Do the inevitable compromises forced on researchers mean that the   6
departure from the ideal conditions is so great that the results are spurious for 
purposes of inference? 
 
We have still not managed to find a satisfactory way of bridging the Eurostat 
regional GDP series across the difference in estimation methodology 
introduced in 1995 so our GDP series ends at 1994. Our dependent variable is 
estimated from common PPS values of GDP p.c. for Eurostat Level 3 regions. 
Estimates of GDP p.c. for FURs are derived by using the distribution of FUR 
population between Level 3 regions at the closest Census dates as weights and 
then applying those weights to the relevant Level 3 GDP p.c. data
3. Because of 
measurement error and short run fluctuations in Eurostat data, we take the start 
point of the series as the mean for 1978-80 and the end point as the mean for 
1992 to 1994. We are thus analysing a period too short to correspond to a 
conceptual long run. Even if the system did tend to equalisation of returns to 
factors on the margin, new shocks and disturbances will occur long before 
such a position is reached. We need, therefore, to model a system in which real 
incomes can permanently (in the sense of any period we can observe) vary 
between cities.  
 
The data used are derived mainly from Eurostat. Regional GDP data have been 
published for most Level 1, 2 and 3 regions since 1978 although for some they 
are available from 1977. There are, however gaps – data for Greek and 
Portuguese regions, for example, only became available later. In both cases, 
Eurostat data have been supplemented with national data. For some countries, 
such as Italy, Eurostat data for earlier years were only published for Level 2 
regions. In this instance, national sources for value added have been used to 
disaggregate from Level 2 to Level 3 values.  The climate data are taken from 
the Climate Research Unit (University of East Anglia) database and for each 
                                                 
3 The EU institutions deal in so-called Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques 
(N.U.T.S.) regions. This is a nesting set of regions based on national territorial divisions. 
The largest are Level 1 regions; the smallest for which a reasonable range of data is 
available are Level 3. These correspond to Counties in the UK, Départements in France; 
Provincies in Italy or Kreise in Germany. Because of cross border commuting flows there is 
inevitably built-in spatial nuisance dependence with this series. The use of self-contained 
FURs minimises this problem.   7
city relate to the 30 km square which contains the geographical centroid of the 
FUR. In the case of Portsmouth and Southampton, the FURs fall within the 
same square but there is considerable climatic variation within most countries. 
Even within the Randstat cities of the Netherlands there is a 10 percent 
variation on most climate measures.  
 
The same control variables are used for industrial structure as have been used 
in previous work (see Cheshire and Magrini, 2000, for an explanation and 
justification). As before, the more detailed measures relating to old resource-
based industries tend to work better than broader measures of specialisation in 
industry. However, it has been found that in most of the present models in 
which GDP p.c. is the dependent variable, the unemployment rate at the start 
of the period is a useful additional control for structure. A measure of the rate 
of growth of GDP p.c. in the area of each country outside the major FURs is 
included as a control for national institutional, policy and other factors which 
may have led to countries having had country-specific differences in their 
growth rates over the period. The variable should also effectively control for 
national differences in the incidence of the economic cycle. In the models in 
which population growth is the dependent variable a comparable variable – the 
rate of natural increase of population in the territory of the country outside its 
major FURs – is used. 
 
Although national dummies have been the way in which this problem has 
frequently been handled in the literature, it seems more elegant and powerful 
to use the continuous variable employed here. It is also consistent with our 
belief that our observations – all the large city-regions of the EU of 12 – 
represent in a statistical sense a homogeneous population. Moreover, as is 
shown in Cheshire and Magrini (2006b), the non-FUR growth variable 
performs very much better econometrically than national dummies. A further 
point of interest is that it eliminates the significance of any measure of the 
initial level of GDP p.c. Previous work has shown that both the significance 
and even sign of this commonly used variable were highly dependent on   8
model specification (Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1996) and this confirms that 
result. It suggests that there is more variance in FUR growth rates across 
countries than within them and that the initial level of GDP p.c. acts in large 
measure as a national dummy. This finding is one factor underlying our 
scepticism with respect to the many estimates of so-called β-convergence 
following Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991; 1992; 1995). All 
the results of models which included the initial level of per capita income were 
unsatisfactory, with highly unstable co-efficient estimates associated with the 
variable and problems of collinearity.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
3a.  Results of modelling urban growth rates: population growth 
We start with a brief summary of the results from modelling population 
growth in the FURs of the EU of 12 between 1980 and 2000 as reported in 
Cheshire and Magrini (2006a). Because the natural rate of increase of 
population for the area of the country outside its major FURs is included as an 
independent variable, we are in effect estimating a quasi-net migration model. 
Table 2a shows the results for a base model with no climate variables in 
column 1 and two of the best performing models in columns 2 and 3. In all 
models, a quadratic form for the climate variables performs best. As well as 
the standard controls two other variables were included. The first is an 
‘interaction’ variable designed to measure localised employment opportunity 
differentials in the early part of the period. This is formulated on the basis that 
changes in commuting patterns are a potential source of spatial adjustment 
where there are densely packed FURs. Changes in commuting patterns 
induced by local differential employment opportunities at the start of the 
period are assumed to be likely to be at least in part converted to actual 
migration gain later. The variable is measured as the sum of all the changes in 
employment in a FUR and all surrounding FURs within 100 minutes travel 
time between 1979 and 1991 discounted by travel time distance (so the impact 
on the value of the variable of a given change in employment declines as the   9
distance between FURs increases and falls to zero if the distance exceeds 100 
minutes). The second is the ‘Integration Gain’ variable designed to measure 
the systematic spatial incidence of economic gains from EU integration. The 
rationale for this is explained in Cheshire and Magrini (2000) but the variable 
measures the change in predicted economic potential for each FUR resulting 
from the integration of the EU of 12 (including lower transport costs). The 
values of the variable are calculated from Clark et al. (1969) supplemented 
with the calculations of Keeble et al. (1988). 
 
Climate variables were formulated in two ways. The first was for each FUR 
relative to the mean value for the EU of 12 as a whole: the second was relative 
to the mean for the country. Variables relative to EU values proved wholly 
non-significant but when formulated relative to country means were strongly 
significance and also had a substantial impact in absolute terms. The linear 
estimates for each independent climate variable provided a simple guide to the 
overall impact of that aspect of climate on population growth. They showed 
that more cloud cover and wetness had a negative impact on growth and a 
warmer and drier climate had a positive impact. Model 1 is the ‘base’ model: 
Models 2 and 3 include combinations of climate variables: frost frequency, 
maximum temperature and wet day frequency - all calculated as ratios of the 
country values. It will be seen that these models appear to perform well and 
provide striking evidence that climatic differences were strongly and 
significantly associated with differential rates of urban population growth. It 
was found, for example, that these climate variables performed in a similar 
way, but statistically more significantly to, simple geographic variables 
measuring how far south or west FURs were relative to national datum points. 
Since the climate variables (and indeed the geographic ones) are only 
significant when measured as differences within countries there is no evidence 
to suggest that differences in climate across the EU as a whole were relevant: 
rather the results suggest that in the last decades of the 20th Century 
population in all countries in the EU of 12 were attracted by, and able on the 
margin to choose to live in places in their countries which had more agreeable   10
climates. This is not inconsistent with a degree of international population 
mobility associated with climatic differences. But it suggests that in so far as 
people did make such moves, they selected the country first and then, in 
choosing locations within countries, chose cities with better weather. 
 
Table 2a about here 
 
Table 2b reports the critical results of a series of diagnostics tests for 
specification and spatial dependence for the same three models. Full results are 
available from the authors but these show the important results. As is well 
known the major problem in testing for problems of spatial dependence is the 
choice of measures of ‘proximity’. Past experience (see, for example, Cheshire 
and Magrini, 2000) had shown that the most sensitive measure of distance 
when analysing growth differences between European FURs was the inverse 
of time distance between pairs of FURs (measured as transit time by road 
including any ferry crossings and using the standard commercial software for 
road freight). In the present case, we tested for both the inverse of time 
distance and the inverse of time distance squared and, in addition, 
experimented with an added time distance for all FURs separated by a national 
border. ‘Time’ effects tested for national borders varied from zero to 120 
minutes. We found that the greatest sensitivity in the tests for spatial 
dependence was achieved if the time cost of a national border was set at 120 
minutes. In addition, the most sensitive measure of total distance was if the 
distance between each pair of FURs was represented as the inverse of time 
distance (including the 120 minutes for a national border) squared.  
 
The diagnostic tests suggest that there are no problems of either 
heteroskedasticity or non-normality of errors. The value of the 
multicollinearity condition number is relatively high in the models in which 
climate variables are included in quadratic form but since the parameter 
estimates are stable and the functional form (effectively suggesting that it is 
asymptotic to an upper value) seems sensible, we are not concerned with this.   11
The highest value for the multicollinearity condition was found for Model 3 
but this may be because the functional form over the range considered is very 
close to linear. Of more concern are the results for the tests for spatial 
dependence. In the models in which climate variables (or ‘south within 
country’) were included the LM error test – the most reliable and appropriate – 
suggests no problems of autocorrelation in errors but the results of the LM lag 
tests (again the most appropriate and reliable) suggest there could be some bias 
because of the omission of a spatial lag variable (or other specification 
problem). This seems likely to be a minor problem, however, only showing up 
as significant at all when distance is represented in the most sensitive form as 
the inverse of time distance squared including the 120 minute national border 
effect: and even then, in Model 3, it is close to the 10% margin of significance. 
  
Table 2b about here 
 
Fitting a spatial lag model using maximum likelihood estimation (Cheshire 
and Magrini, 2006a) produces very similar results to those reported here. As 
suggested by the tests for spatial dependence, the spatially lagged value of 
population growth is significant. However, all signs remain appropriate and – 
except for the spatial Integration Gain variable in the ‘base’ model - all 
variables are significant at at least 10%. A few variables however, cease to be 
significant at 5%. All other variables are significant at 5% or better, however, 
and the diagnostics remain reassuring. Perhaps most reassuring of all, and 
again consistent with the conclusion that problems of spatial dependence are 
for practical purposes very minor, the coefficient estimates for equivalent 
models hardly change numerically in the spatially lagged estimate compared to 
the robust standard errors, OLS estimates reported in Table 2a. 
 
Apart from these variables which are significantly associated with population 
growth it is worth noting some which are not. Neither the local concentration 
of university students per employee at the start of the period nor the 
concentration of R&D facilities of major companies was significant. Indeed,   12
the sign with respect to the R&D variable was consistently negative and close 
to significant. 
 
3b.  Results of modelling urban growth rates: GDP p.c. growth  
One conclusion from this analysis of urban population growth is that it is 
unreasonable to apply a full compensating advantages model to the major city 
regions of the EU. Although the influence of some measures of differential 
economic opportunities seems to be EU-wide, the effect of climatic differences 
- the most widely used measure of quality of life differences – are not. 
Moreover strong national border effects are found when we test for spatial 
dependence. Not only is migration orders of magnitude less than it is in the 
US, in the EU it still seems to be significantly confined within national 
borders. This means that the argument that population movement is the best 
measure of relative spatial welfare differences (see for example Glaeser et al., 
1995) is difficult to sustain in a European context. In turn, this suggests that 
(differences in) the growth of real incomes is a significant indicator of 
(changes in) welfare levels across the FURs of the EU. This lends additional 
importance to understanding sources of differential growth in urban incomes. 
There is no data available on household disposable incomes across the EU so 
we have to use real GDP p.c. It is more appropriate to think of these results as 
investigating sources of productivity rather than income growth, therefore, 
although the two are likely to be highly correlated. 
 
The results of three models are reported in Table 3a. The first includes only 
non-spatial control variables. As the tests for spatial dependence (Table 3b) 
show, this model is subject to significant spatial lag problems and so is open to 
concerns that it will yield inconsistent parameter estimates for the variables 
included to test hypotheses about the causal factors in urban economic growth. 
Rather than attempt to fix these problems by simply introducing a spatial lag, 
we interpret this result as an example of a wider class of problem: that of 
omitted variables. We attempt to address the problem, therefore, by extending 
the logic applied to the population growth models and looking for variables   13
which plausibly measure underlying spatial adjustment processes. Model 5 is 
constructed in this spirit, using what one might think of as ‘artisanal’ methods 
– that is including only control variables and variables specifically chosen 
either to test hypotheses or to account for spatial adjustment processes. Model 
6 is a specific model emerging from the automated model selection algorithms 
employed in PcGets (see Hendry and Krolzig, 2001). The set of variables 
available to the selection procedure included all variables available, including 
those relating to climate. All variables are significant and all those in Model 5 
have the expected sign
4. The automated model selection procedures 
interestingly include one of the climatic variables (not included in the 
‘artisanal’ modelling process) as well as all those variables included in the 
artisanal model. This provides evidence that a better climate relative to the 
national mean was significantly associated with slower growth in GDP pc. 
This result is discussed below. 
 
As was noted in section 2, the rate of growth of that part of each country 
outside its major FURs was used as a control  - rather than national dummies - 
for basic differences in policy, the incidence of the cycle and other factors. 
Controls for industrial structure were as employed in Cheshire and Magrini 
(2000) although the unemployment rate at the start of the period was included 
as an additional control. Other controls were designed to reflect as far as 
possible underlying (urban) economic theory and evidence. The log of 
population size is included with the expectation that larger cities will have 
grown faster in terms of GDP p.c. because of productivity gains in larger urban 
areas (see Costa and Kahn, 2000 for a convincing account of at least one 
important source of such productivity gains in larger cities). Dynamic 
agglomeration economies are another possible explanation. Initial population 
density was included since, allowing for agglomeration economies, cities with 
higher density will have higher costs of space and greater congestion. A 
negative relationship is expected. In our judgement, initial population density 
is likely mainly to reflect differences between FURs in the constraint on urban 
                                                 
4 Models were estimated in Stata using robust standard errors.   14
land supply produced by land use regulation. Higher density, other things 
equal, signals a tighter constraint imposed on development. Topography and 
the inertia of inheritance embodied in the built environment no doubt 
contribute to differences in densities but probably less than land use policy 
which varies substantially both across countries and between cities in Europe. 
 
Model 4 (which includes no ‘spatial variables’) does include variables 
designed to test significant hypotheses about processes of urban economic 
growth in Europe. The first pair is straightforward. They are measures of 
specific, highly skilled, human capital and of relative concentrations of R&D 
activity. These are represented as the number of university students per 
employee over the period 1977 to 1979 in the FUR and as the number of R&D 
establishments of Fortune top 500 companies per million population in 1980. 
Thus, both are measured right at the start of the period to minimise possible 
problems of endogeneity. 
 
The last independent variable included in the non-spatial, base model, is 
designed to test whether there is a relationship between the boundaries of its 
governments and a FUR’s growth rate. With EU integration over the past 20 
years there has been an associated development of territorial competition or 
competition between regions to promote local growth. To the extent that there 
is an ‘output’ from such activities, it is local economic growth. Suspending our 
disbelief in the possible efficacy of local growth policies
5, any provision of 
additional local economic growth would be, in effect, the production of a pure 
local public good. Extra local growth is non-excludable in the sense that if a 
region’s economy grows as a result of local policy, those who did not 
contribute to the (costs of) the policy cannot be excluded from enjoying its 
                                                 
5 As we stress in Cheshire and Magrini (2006b) we take a very broad view of ‘growth 
promotion policies’. We emphatically do not confine our definition to attempts to lure 
mobile investors. Such policies probably have a very doubtful potential net benefit. 
Successful policies might mainly take the form of efficient local public administration 
which is business friendly, the efficient co-ordination f infrastructure and economic 
development and effective education and training policies. Since none of these necessarily 
cost more than their ineffective counterparts, their strength cannot be measured by local 
expenditures. 
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benefits; and it would have a zero opportunity cost in consumption in the sense 
that if, say, one agent’s employment prospects or rents are improved, there 
would be no reduction in the employment prospects or rents of others. There 
are, therefore, the usual problems associated with the provision of (local) 
public goods, including a classic problem of spatial spillovers. Whether or not 
growth promotion policies are engaged in will be conditioned primarily on the 
structure of the incentives faced by the economic actors who may attempt to 
form a public/private consortium or ‘growth promotion club’.  
 
It is reasonable to think of any FUR as being made up of one or more 
administrative units and that a ‘club’ of administrative units (whether 
including private sector actors or not) will have to be formed to provide 
growth promotion policies. It is also reasonable to assume that the largest unit 
within the FUR – the central unit – will always be a part of such a club, either 
alone or together with other administrative units, so the territory of a FUR is 
made up of two potential sets of governmental units: the policy club members 
and the group of non-participating units.  
 
The expected gross payoff will be a direct function of the additional growth 
that a given club expects it can generate. Since FURs are defined to be 
economically self-contained, it is reasonable to assume that the territory their 
boundaries identify contains any benefits that might be generated by local 
growth promotion policies. For a given potential growth gain for a FUR (the 
spatial unit containing the benefits of the growth) the expected payoff for any 
growth club will fall as the size of the territory they control or represent falls in 
relation to that of the FUR within the boundaries of which the ‘club’ is located. 
This is because the spillover losses to areas of the FUR not represented in the 
club will increase. Equally, assuming other factors are constant, the expected 
net payoff would fall as the transactions costs necessarily incurred to form the 
club increase. Transactions costs will be positively related to the number of 
relevant potential members and the institutional dominance of the lead actor 
(which we can assume will be a governmental unit). Thus expected net   16
benefits will increase and costs fall as the size of the largest (normally that 
representing the central unit or urban core) governmental unit increases 
relative to the size of the FUR. Arguments such as these led Cheshire and 
Gordon (1996, page 389) to conclude that growth promotion policies would be 
more likely to appear and be more energetically pursued where “there are a 
smaller number of public agencies representing the functional economic 
region, with the boundaries of the highest tier authority approximating to those 
of the region…”. 
 
Applying this analysis it is possible to specify a variable closely reflecting this 
feature of FURs: the ratio of the total population of the largest (relevant) unit 
of government representing the FUR to the population of the FUR as a whole. 
We are implicitly assuming this ‘relevant’ unit of government will be the unit 
with the largest population, usually representing the central administrative unit 
of the FUR, but this is qualified by ‘relevant’: by which we mean that the 
governmental unit concerned must have significant powers of action. Even 
though it might be the largest N.U.T.S. region with a territory overlapping that 
of the London FUR, for example, one could not define the South East Region 
as a ‘relevant’ governmental unit for the London FUR because it had 
essentially no powers
6.  The rules by which such ‘relevant’ local government 
units were identified were established before any models including the 
variable were estimated so that the variable could be defined blind of the data. 
These rules are set out in Cheshire and Magrini (2006b).  
 
We call this the policy incentive variable because it is designed to measure the 
incentive and perhaps the capacity to prosecute policies promoting growth at 
the FUR level. In identifying the largest ‘relevant’ unit of government, 
‘relevant’ is defined as a sub-national unit of government with an 
administrative area encompassing or corresponding to some proportion of the 
territory of a FUR and which has significant administrative and decision-
making powers. Since the largest ‘relevant’ unit was selected, it was also in all 
                                                 
6 During the period analysed there was a South East Regional Planning Council 
(SERPLAN) but this was effectively no more than a forum for discussion.   17
cases the highest tier of sub-national government relating to the territory of the 
FUR. Since one criterion was that the unit of government selected should have 
significant administrative and decision making powers the Level 1 regions 
were potentially available for selection in European countries with an 
appropriate regional level of government. In practice, this means that the value 
of the variable ranged from only about 0.125 to over 2. We might further 
hypothesise that if the value of the variable were very high, so that the size of 
the ‘relevant’ unit of government considerably exceeded the size of the FUR, 
then the capacity to generate local growth promoting policies would begin to 
weaken. This is because the interests of the FUR would begin to be lost in 
those of the larger unit which might pursue policies favouring rural areas or 
smaller centres. If this were the case then we would expect to observe a 
quadratic functional form with a maximum positive impact where the value of 
the policy incentive variable was between 1 and 2. 
 
Turning now to the results reported in Tables 3a and 3b we see that all the 
variables in the core model are significant and have the expected sign except 
that the co-efficient on the squared term associated with the policy incentive 
variable is non-significant. Thus, the variable itself is significant but the 
evidence that the appropriate functional form is quadratic as hypothesised is 
weak. The adjusted R
2, with 121 observations in a cross sectional analysis, is 
0.64. Table 3b, reporting the results of the diagnostic tests, suggests that there 
are no problems of non-normality of errors or heteroskedasticity but that if a 
time distance penalty is included in the distance weights matrix there are 
significant problems of spatial dependence, most obviously problems of a 
spatial lag. For the set of models of economic rather than population growth 
we experimented with a full set of national border time-distance penalties 
ranging from zero to infinity. Problems of spatial dependence tended to show 
up most strongly when the penalty imposed for a national border was 600 
minutes.  
   18
As noted above we interpret this result as signalling that there is in effect a 
problem of omitted variables. There are underlying mechanisms of spatial 
adjustment causing interaction in the growth rates of neighbouring FURs as 
well as, perhaps, direct spatial effects, so we should not expect the growth 
behaviour of a FUR to be independent of that of its neighbours. One such 
factor has already been identified in the context of the analysis of rates of 
population growth. The process of European interaction has long been argued 
to differentially favour ‘core’ regions so the first spatial variable to include is 
the familiar measure of change in economic potential – or the Integration Gain 
variable. 
 
A further obvious reason for expecting interaction in the growth rates of 
neighbouring FURs can be found in the literature on labour market search 
behaviour. If productivity, wages or job opportunities are relatively improving 
in one urban area then those who can access those opportunities at the lowest 
cost – who live nearest – will tend to do so. Migration is expensive but 
changes in commuting patterns respond to only small differences in 
opportunities (see, for example, Gordon and Lamont, 1982 or Morrison, 
2006). We should expect that if a FUR’s growth rate were negatively 
influenced by a concentration of unemployment in it at the start of the period 
then a concentration of unemployed in closely surrounding FURs would also 
have a negative impact. Given the possibility of job search in surrounding 
labour markets we would expect higher unemployment not to be just localised, 
moreover, but in densely urbanised regions, we would expect unemployment 
rates for workers of comparable skill levels to even out between neighbouring 
FURs. This leads us to introduce as independent variables both the 
unemployment rate in the FUR itself at the start of the period and the weighted 
sum of unemployment in all surrounding FURs discounted by distance. Since 
the search areas of low skilled workers who are disproportionately 
overrepresented amongst the unemployed are confined geographically, we 
should expect the impact of unemployment on the economic performance of 
neighbouring FURs to decline rapidly with distance. Experiment confirmed   19
this, showing that the best statistical results were achieved if the cut-off was 
set at 60 minutes. 
 
Similarly, the literature on the spatial pattern of innovation shows a distance 
decay effect, with patents tending to be applied more frequently nearer to the 
location of the patent and innovation rates declining with distance. We should 
expect the impact of R&D with respect to innovation to be subject to a 
distance decay effect, therefore (see for example Audretsch, 1998). This 
implies that we should expect R&D in one urban area to have a positive 
impact on innovation and growth in neighbouring urban areas which would 
fall as the distance between them increased. Such mechanisms, leading to 
systematic spatial dependence in the growth rates of FURs, will depend on the 
costs of commuting and perhaps communication. It, therefore, seems not only 
most appropriate to formulate these ‘spatial’ variables so that their impact 
declines with distance but also to include a specific time-distance penalty for 
national borders. We in fact experimented with alternative distance decay and 
national border factors but the best results were obtained using essentially the 
same formulae as employed to calculate the spatial weights matrix. The impact 
of unemployment and R&D on growth performance in neighbouring FURs 
was assumed to decline with the inverse squared of time-distance and be 
subject to a 600 minute national border time-distance penalty. As noted above, 
for unemployment, an upper cut-off of 60 minutes performed best but for 
R&D the best performing cut-off was found to be 150 minutes.  
 
The fourth ‘spatial’ variable is the relative concentration of university students 
in neighbouring FURs at the start of the period, again discounted by distance 
and with a national border penalty. Here we expect a negative impact on 
growth in a particular FUR of a stronger relative concentration of university 
students at the start of the period in neighbouring FURs; and we also expect 
the distance over which such an effect would be measured to be longer than 
with unemployment. While a higher stock of unemployed within a tightly 
clustered set of urban areas should be expected to contribute to lower growth   20
in all of them because of the way in which local labour markets work to even 
out unemployment rates for workers of given skill levels between areas open 
to commuting
7, the same is not true of a higher relative stock of university 
students in surrounding FURs at the start of the period. Here, there is no 
tendency for their distribution to be evened out by the operation of local labour 
markets: rather a higher stock within a given FUR at the start of the period 
represented a resource for future growth. A concentration of workers 
embodying greater human capital is associated with faster growth over the 
subsequent period in the FUR in which they are found. Not only should this be 
expected to increase the growth performance of the FUR (captured in our 
direct University Student variable) but also the additional growth will increase 
relative job opportunities and tend to suck in complementary labour, including 
high human capital labour, from surrounding FURs over the period. Since the 
commuting range of higher skilled workers is greater, we should expect this 
effect to be measurable over a longer distance than was the case with 
unemployment. The best results were obtained if the cut-off was set at 150 
minutes to which was again added a 600 minute national border time-distance 
penalty. 
 
The final ‘spatial’ variable was a dummy for peripherality. There has been 
much discussion in the literature of the impact of peripherality. We have 
already accounted for the impact of European integration via our Integration 
Gain variable but regions deemed peripheral may have common features (such 
as lower factor costs for example) and also have tended to be recipients of 
regional aid from the EU. Although the impact of such aid has been questioned 
(see, for example, Midelfart and Overman, 2002, or Fratesi and Rodriguez-
Pose, 2004) still it is unlikely to have been systematically negative. To avoid 
subjective judgements about what regions are - or are not - peripheral this 
variable is formulated simply in terms of time-distance from Brussels; any 
                                                 
7 Although FURs are defined to be as self contained in commuting terms as possible where 
they are tightly packed (for example in the Ruhr region of Germany) it is virtually zero cost 
for a worker living on the edge of any FUR to change to commute to the neighbouring 
FUR(s).   21
FUR 600 minutes or more from Brussels ignoring national borders is classified 
as peripheral.  
 
When these variables are added, the model performance improves without 
significantly changing the parameter estimates associated with the main 
explanatory variables while the problems of spatial dependence (see Table 3b) 
are eliminated. This would seem to be a highly satisfactory result replacing a 
technical solution (which in this case would have been introducing a spatial 
lag) with one based on economic mechanisms. Two points about the results 
reported for Models 5 and particularly 6 should be noted. The first is that 
although the squared term on the policy incentive variable is still not 
significant at conventional levels, an F-test shows that neither term should be 
eliminated: both perform significantly better than either alone. The second 
point is that when automated methods of model selection are used (see Hendry 
and Krolzig, 2004) the same set of independent variables is selected plus a 
quadratic form associated with climate. All else taken into account, there was a 
statistically significant association between faster economic growth and a FUR 
having a wetter climate relative to its national average. One should add that the 
climate variables are highly correlated and if the wetness variable is excluded 
then the maximum temperature relative to the country is selected and is 
significant with a negative sign. 
 
At first blush, it may not seem obvious why climate should systematically 
influence urban economic performance in any causal way and for that reason 
the climate variables were not included in the ‘artisanal’ process of model 
construction. However, drawing on the literature deriving from Roback (1982) 
and reviewed in Gyourko et al. (1999) there is, in fact, a reasonable argument. 
A better climate will be capitalised into land prices and traded off by 
individuals against higher wages. As discussed in section 3a above, there is 
strong evidence that national climatic differences are very significant in 
explaining patterns of population growth and mobility between FURs within 
countries. This is consistent with a process of sorting between FURs, with   22
concentrations of human capital and R&D facilities being negatively but not 
significantly associated with population growth, while a drier and warmer 
climate relative to a country’s mean is strongly and significantly associated 
with population growth. This suggests that there was some selection process 
going on with people more motivated by quality of life and with lower skills 
tending to be differentially attracted to cities with a better relative climate. This 
implies, other things equal, that those more work and skill oriented – together 
with activities employing such labour – would find costs lower and welfare 
levels higher in FURs with relatively worse climates. Since this was a dynamic 
process – the dependent variable was a proxy for net migration over the 20 
year period 1980-2000 – it would imply a faster rate of productivity and wage 
growth in FURs with climates worse than their countries’ means. In essence, 
this is no more than the application of the insight that people who think they 
are likely to be unemployed anyway might as well live somewhere nice if 
there is a national system of welfare support.  
 
Table 3a and Table 3b about here 
 
 4.  The contrasts and similarities: conclusions 
The contrasts and similarities in these two sets of models not only reveal some 
interesting differences in the drivers of population compared to real GDP per 
capita growth but also suggests some insights into the underlying patterns of, 
and constraints on, urban change in the EU of 12. Cities (as FURs) with 
greater attraction to population and greater productivity growth have some 
important structural characteristics in common. They share a common 
inheritance in terms of the old resource based industries of coal mining and 
port activity: these were underrepresented in the fast growing cities. Similarly, 
the faster growing cities were in wider regions with significant but not 
excessive agricultural employment (the very high proportions of agricultural 
employment in 1975 were found only in a few regions which still had a 
substantial, undercapitalised peasant population). Moreover, they had two 
related structural factors in common also: at the start of the period, there was a   23
lower representation of industrial activity (favouring population growth) or 
lower relative unemployment (favouring economic growth). Finally there was 
one more EU-wide economic influence the more dynamic cities shared: they 
tended to be the systematic beneficiaries of the effects of European integration 
as measured by the change in economic potential associated with the 
formation and enlargement of the EU and falling transport costs. These were 
all EU-wide influences on urban growth of both population and GDP pc. 
However, of these only really the impact of European integration can be 
thought of as a European-wide factor. The other factors are common but could 
all be working within a national context. Having a coal mining inheritance, for 
example, was a negative for both economic and population growth but that is 
consistent with it simply being that in the last two decades of the 20th Century 
coal mining was declining in all of the old established areas and left behind a 
set of skills and an environment unattractive to migrants and new economic 
activity everywhere. 
 
 A set of equally significant factors differs. We find that a relatively better 
climate within, but only within, countries was statistically the single most 
significant factor associated with differential population growth. Quality of life 
differences were important in making cities more or less attractive to people 
but only quality of life differences between cities within the same country. On 
the other hand, stronger economic growth was significantly associated with a 
city having a worse climate relative to the rest of its country once all other 
factors had been allowed for. As argued above, this finding is consistent with 
the quality of life model and a process of sorting of population between 
locations (within countries) meaning that less work oriented/less highly skilled 
people seemed to be choosing a better climate (driving up property prices) 
relative to employment opportunities. One may even be able to see the impact 
of this in the different role of a city’s share of industrial employment at the 
start of the period compared to unemployment. A higher level of 
unemployment was found to be associated with slower economic growth; and 
higher unemployment is associated with worse employment prospects and a   24
less skilled labour force on average. However, although an initial relative 
specialisation in industry is correlated positively with higher unemployment, 
the variable appearing as significant in the population growth models is 
industrial specialisation. One should put this finding together with findings 
from the housing market hedonic literature (for example Cheshire and 
Sheppard, 1995) or the literature on population and employment 
decentralisation (for example, Thurston and Yezer, 1994) which concludes 
that the presence of industry is an environmental ‘bad’ which people pay a 
premium to have less of in their neighbourhoods or move away from. Looked 
at in this light then one can see that less industry in a city might have attracted 
mobile population while more unemployment would be less significant. At the 
same time, more unemployment would be a negative factor in terms of growth 
of per capita incomes or productivity while more industry was neutral.  
 
We also find that a concentration of potentially highly productive workers 
(university students) was favourable to productivity growth but not significant 
in the context of population growth and a concentration of R&D activity was 
also significantly associated with productivity growth but, if anything, 
negatively associated with population growth. This latter finding is again 
consistent with a process of sorting of more highly skilled and work oriented 
people concentrating in higher income and growth cities while less skilled or 
work orientated concentrated in cheaper and ‘nice’ cities. We also find that 
having a government structure more favourable to promoting local economic 
growth helped a city’s growth performance in economic terms but had no 
impact on its population growth. 
 
When we compare patterns of spatial interaction and spatial dependence we 
find revealing features in common. The models do not work in identical ways 
– the details of the mechanisms of spatial interaction differ – but the 
fundamental patterns are similar. We can identify economic mechanisms, 
chiefly relating to search patterns in local labour markets and to differences in 
the costs of changing commuting patterns compared to migration, which   25
produce systematic interaction in growth of both population and productivity. 
In the case of productivity growth, we can also identify interaction 
mechanisms resulting from the tendency to apply innovations locally. Europe 
seems to be composed of city-states but these are not isolated city-states: 
where they are densely packed, they locally interact. They still exist largely 
within national urban systems, however, so even discounting for the low 
incidence of population mobility in Europe compared to the US, we should not 
expect to observe a full spatial equilibrium across the whole set of city-regions 
in the EU. Not only do national borders still represent substantial barriers to 
spatial interaction – apparently the equivalent of a day’s travel time – but 
quality of life differences, although important determinants of the 
attractiveness of a city to mobile population, still seem to be confined in their 
influence to their own national territories.   26
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  Table 1:  Variable Definitions 
 
No Variable  Name  Description 
 Constant   
1  Ln Population  Natural log of population in 1979 
2  Population density  Density of population in FUR in 1979 
3  Industrial Emp. 1975  % of labour force in industry in surrounding NUTS 2 region 1975 
4  Coalfield: core  A dummy=1 if the core of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
5  Coalfield: hinterland  A dummy=1 if the hinterland of the FUR is located in a coalfield 
6  Port size 1969*  Volume of port trade in 1969 in tons 
7  Agric Emp.1975*  % of labour force in agriculture in surrounding NUTS 2 region 1975 
8  Unemployment 1977/81*  Mean FUR unemployment rate 1977 to 1981 
9  Nat Ex-FUR GDP Growth  ’79-
‘93 
Annualised rate of growth of GDP p.c. in the territory of each country 
outside major FURs between 1978/80 and 1992/94 
10  Nat Ex-FUR Pop Grow ’80-’00  Annualised rate of growth of population in territory of country outside 
major FURs between 1980 and 2000 
11 Policy  Incentive*  Ratio of FUR population to that of the largest governmental unit 
associated with the FUR (1981): see below for details. 
12  University Students emp. ratio 
1977/78/79*  Ratio of university students 1977-78 to total FUR employment 1979 
13  R&D Facilities per million 
population* 
R&D laboratories of Fortune top 500 companies per million population 
1980 
14  South within Country  Distance south of centre of FUR from national capital city (Amsterdam 
taken as capital of Netherlands; Bonn of Germany) 
15  West within Country  Distance west of centre of FUR from national capital city (Amsterdam 
taken as capital of Netherlands; Bonn of Germany) 
16  South within EU  Distance south of centre of FUR from Bruxelles/Brussel 
17  West within EU  Distance west of centre of FUR from Bruxelles/Brussel 
18 Frost  frequency*  Ratio of frequency of days with frost between FUR and national 
average (1970s and 1980s) 
19 Wet  days*  Ratio of wet day frequency between FUR and national average (1970s 
and 1980s) 
20 Maximum  temperature*  Ratio of maximum temperature between FUR and national average 
(1970s and 1980s) 
21 Integration  Gain*  Change in economic potential for FUR resulting from pre-Treaty of 
Rome EEC to post enlargement EU with reduced transport costs  
22  Peripherality dummy  Dummy=1 if FUR more than 10 hours time distance from Brussels 
23  University Student density 
employment 
Sum of university students per 1000 employees in all FURs within 150 
minutes travel time discounted by distance with 600 time penalty 
added for national borders 
24  R&D Facilities density 
population 
Sum of R&D Facilities per million population in all FURs within 150 
minutes travel time discounted by distance with 600 time penalty for 
national borders 
25  Unemployment 1977/81 density  
Sum of differences between the unemployment rate (average between 
1977 and 1981) of a FUR and the rates in neighbouring FURs up to 60 
min away discounted by time-distance with a 600 minute time-distance 
border penalty. 
26 Interaction  ’79-’91 
Sum of the differences in the growth rate of employment in the FUR 
and in all FURs within 100 minutes travelling time discounted by 
distance over the period 1979-1991   30
Table 2a:  Dependent Variable: FUR Population Growth Rate 1980 to 2000; Selected Models 
Model  ‘Base’ Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
R-squared  0.5180 0.6326 0.6405 
Constant  plus:     
Agric Emp.’75  0.0004102  0.0004266  0.0004079 
std. err.  0.0000974  0.0000987  0.0000923 
t  4.21 4.32 4.42 
Agric Emp.’75
2 -0.0000094  -0.00000826  -0.00000753 
std. err.  0.0000026  0.00000249  0.00000246 
t  -3.61 -3.31 -3.06 
Industrial  Emp.’75  -0.0001693 -0.0001457 -0.0001213 
std. err.  0.0000416  0.0000393  0.0000341 
t  -4.07 -3.71 -3.55 
Coalfield: core  -0.0021143  -0.001655  -0.001812 
std. err.  0.0008684  0.0007881  0.000748 
t  -2.43 -2.10 -2.42 
Coalfield: hint’land  -0.0020548  -0.001682  -0.0018028 
std. err.  0.0008282  0.0007934  0.0007607 
t  -2.48 -2.12 -2.37 
Port  size  ’69  -0.0007278 -0.0006274 -0.0006521 
std. err.  0.0002844  0.0002422  0.0002469 
t  -2.56 -2.59 -2.64 
Port size ’69
2 0.0000366  0.0000294  0.0000315 
std. err.  0.0000146  0.0000123  0.0000124 
t  2.51 2.39 2.55 
Nat Ex-FUR Pop Grow ’80-’00  0.4417852  0.5536141  0.4710524 
std. err.  0.1117606  0.1127851  0.1075922 
t  3.95 4.91 4.38 
Integration Gain
2 0.0011278  0.0020954  0.0020679 
std. err.  0.0004542  0.0004612  0.0004593 
t  2.48 4.54 4.50 
Interaction ’79-’91  0.0440806  0.0532723  0.0519908 
std. err.  0.0209222  0.0197226  0.0190658 
t  2.11 2.70 2.73 
Frost frequency ratio : country    -0.0039281   
std.  err.   0.001571  
t   -2.50  
Frost frequency ratio
2  :  country   0.0020628  
std.  err.   0.0006133  
t   3.36  
Maximum temperature ratio : country      -0.0752656 
std. err.      0.0322676 
t     -2.33 
Maximum temperature ratio
2 : country      0.0379645 
std. err.      0.0151008 
t     2.51 
Wet day frequency ratio : country    -0.0247  -0.0202854 
std. err.    0.0065655  0.0056615 
t   -3.76  -3.58 
Wet day frequency ratio
2 : country    0.008621  0.0069708 
std. err.    0.0030658  0.0029409 
t   2.81  2.37 
Notes:  All parameter estimates significant at 5% or better.   31
 
Table 2b:  Diagnostics for Population Growth - Models 1, 2 and 3 
  ‘Base’ Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
R
2-adj 0.4741  0.5841 0.5930 
LogLikelihood 550.3160 566.7440 568.063 
F-test 11.8200  13.0361 13.4905 
F-test (prob)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Regression Diagnostics           
Multicollinearity Condition Number  19.7911     143.0190    487.77    
Test On Normality Of Errors                   
Test DF  Value  Prob  DF  Value  Prob       
Jarque-Bera 2  4.4466  0.1083  2  2.4107 0.2996  2  1.3645 0.5055 
Diagnostics For Heteroskedasticity (random coeff.)            
Test  DF  Value  Prob DF  Value  Prob DF  Value  Prob 
Breusch-Pagan 10  9.4059  0.4941  14 15.3892  0.3521  14 15.7706  0.3276 
Diagnostics For Spatial Dependence           
Test  MI/DF  Value Prob MI/DF  Value  Prob MI/DF  Value Prob 
  For Weight Matrix 120 mins borders +Inverse time distance 
Moran’s I (Error)  0.0245  3.1722 0.0015 0.0175  2.9603 0.0031 0.0124  2.5297 0.0114 
Lagrange Multiplier (Error) 1  1.4695  0.2254  1  0.7497 0.3866  1  0.3764 0.5395 
Lagrange Multiplier (Lag)  1  3.1892 0.0741  1 2.6616  0.1028 1 1.6872  0.1940 
  For Weight Matrix 120 mins borders +Inverse time distance squared 
Moran’s I (Error)  0.1248  3.2825 0.0010 0.0797  2.5592 0.0105 0.0726  2.3999 0.0164 
Lagrange Multiplier (Error)  1  5.7734 0.0163  1 2.3529  0.1250 1 1.9511  0.1625 
Lagrange Multiplier (Lag)  1  8.8033 0.0030  1  4.1270 0.0422  1  2.8366 0.0921 
Notes:  Italics indicates significant at 10% and Bold at 5%.   32
Table 3a:  Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to 
Mean 1992/4 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
R
2  0.6785 0.7555  0.7719 
Adjusted R
2  0.6372 0.7095  0.7235 
AIC -10.8686  -11.0440  -10.9797 
LIK -671.552  -688.488  692.681 
Observations 121  121  121 
Constant -0.03200  -0.0262573  -0.03772 
s.e. 0.00937  0.009193  0.01004 
Nat Ex-FUR GDP Growth  ’79-‘93  0.94416  0.902537  0.85222 
s.e. 0.10238  0.097571  0.09720 
Coalfield – core  -0.00621  -0.005213  -0.00524 
s.e. 0.00120  0.001287  0.00128 
Coalfield – hinterland  -0.00418  -0.003176  -0.00327 
s.e. 0.00160  0.001526  0.00150 
Port Size  -0.00147  -0.000922  -0.00096 
s.e. 0.00040  0.000379  0.00037 
Port Size squared
  0.00008 0.000045*  0.000047 
s.e. 0.00003  0.000024  0.000023 
Agricultural Employment  0.00051  0.000484  0.00034 
s.e. 0.00016  0.000159  0.00016 
Agricultural Employment squared
  -0.000013 -0.000012  -0.000010 
s.e. 0.000004  0.000004  0.000004 
Unemployment Rate    -0.00031  -0.00035 
s.e.   0.000136  0.00014 
Population Size  0.002118  0.001611  0.001496 
s.e. 0.000600  0.000557  0.00055 
Population Density  -0.0000015  -0.0000013  -0.0000013 
s.e. 0.0000007  0.0000006  0.0000006 
University Students  0.0000309  0.000031  0.0000259 
s.e. 0.0000116  0.000011  0.0000104 
R&D Facilities  0.000808  0.000845  0.00079 
s.e. 0.000285  0.000275  0.00027 
Policy Incentive  0.007500  0.008562
a 0.00770
 a 
s.e. 0.00335  0.003455  0.00253 
Policy Incentive squared
  -0.002089  -0.002647*
 a  -0.00253
 a 
s.e.  0.001580  0.001554  0.00153 
Wet days      0.03834 
s.e.     0.01450 
Wet days squared      -0.01928 
s.e.     0.00725 
Integration Gain    0.005162  0.00435 
s.e.   0.001430  0.00149 
R&D Facilities Density    0.262331  0.25088 
s.e.   0.094307  0.09388 
Peripherality Dummy    0.005411  0.00632 
s.e.   0.001318  0.00133 
University Students Density    -0.010527  -0.01097 
s.e.   0.003797  0.00371 
Unemployment Rate Density    -0.134403*  -0.12129* 
s.e.   0.069318  0.06806 
Notes:  4=Base model without spatial variables; 5=Artisanal’;  6=PcGets Best Models 
  Italics indicate not significant at 10%: all variables significant at 5% except where indicated with an asterisk. 
 
a  Significant at 10% only but F test indicates they should not be excluded as a pair at 5% level.   33
Table 3b: Regression diagnostics for : 4=Base model without spatial variables, 5=Artisanal’ & 6=PcGets Best Models 
Notes:  Results in italics are significant at 10% level; Results in bold are significant at 5% level 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Regression Diagnostics           
Multicollinearity  Condition  Number  80.62     100.87    170.52    
T e s t   O n   N o r m a l i t y   O f   E r r o r s            
Test  DF Value  Prob  DF Value  Prob  DF Value  Prob 
Jarque-Bera  2 3.3273  0.1894 2 1.2374  0.5386 2 3.1805  0.2039 
Diagnostics  for  Heteroskedasticity  (random  coeff.)          
Test  DF Value  Prob  DF Value  Prob  DF Value  Prob 
Breusch-Pagan  13 19.3825  0.1117  19 20.8169  0.3470  21 28.6001  0.1239 
Diagnostics For Spatial Dependence           
Test  MI/DF Value  Prob  MI/DF Value  Prob  MI/DF Value  Prob 
  For Weight Matrix with infinite national border effect + Inverse time distance  
Moran’s I (error)  0.04344 1.8729 0.0611  -0.04784 -0.1457 0.8842 -0.05938 -0.3514 0.7253 
Lagrange  Multiplier  (error)  1 0.9212  0.3372 1 1.1171  0.2905 1 1.7209  0.1896 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  6.6183 0.0101  1 1.4510  0.2284 1 1.5775  0.2091 
  For Weight Matrix with infinite national border effect + Inverse time distance squared 
Moran’s I (error)  0.05593 1.4068  0.1595  -0.06140 -0.1916 0.8480  -0.08193 -0.4126 0.6799 
Lagrange  Multiplier  (error)  1 0.6996  0.4029 1 0.8432  0.3585 1 1.5016  0.2204 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  7.1177 0.0076  1 1.9795  0.1594 1 1.6855  0.1942 
  For Weight Matrix with 600 mins borders + Inverse time distance 
Moran’s I (error)  0.0303  2.8693 0.0041  -0.01504 0.6940 0.4877  -0.02051 0.4639 0.6427 
Lagrange  Multiplier  (error)  1 1.5984  0.2061 1 0.3938  0.5303 1 0.7321  0.3922 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  5.8394 0.0157  1 0.9660  0.3257 1 1.1201  0.2899 
  For Weight Matrix with 600 mins borders + Inverse time distance squared 
Moran’s I (error)  0.06620 1.7888 0.0736  -0.03589 -0.1484 0.8820 -0.05842 -0.1759 0.8604 
Lagrange  Multiplier  (error)  1 1.3233  0.2500 1 0.3888  0.5329 1 1.0305  0.3100 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  7.1366 0.0076  1 1.5291  0.2162 1 1.2755  0.2587 
  For Weight Matrix with 0 mins borders + Inverse time distance 
Moran’s I (error)  0.0143  2.3972 0.0165  -0.01538 0.4386 0.6610  -0.0159 0.5131 0.6079 
Lagrange  Multiplier  (error)  1 0.5553  0.4561 1 0.6440  0.4223 1 0.6882  0.4068 
Lagrange  Multiplier  (lag)  1 2.4908  0.1145 1 0.4333  0.5104 1 0.5508  0.4580 
  For Weight Matrix with 0 mins borders + Inverse time distance squared   
Moran’s I (error)  0.0573  1.7963 0.0724  -0.02911 0.1375 0.8906  -0.03337 0.1464 0.8836 
Lagrange  Multiplier  (error)  1 1.3549  0.2444 1 0.3498  0.5542 1 0.4596  0.4978 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)  1  2.8781 0.0898  1 0.1902  0.6627 1 0.1367  0.7116 